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A. Introduction 
 
On 23 July 2008, the President of the French Republic promulgated – two days after 
the final vote of the two chambers of Parliament sitting jointly in Congrès 
(Congress) – the constitutional revision bill “de modernisation des institutions de la 
Vème République” (of modernization of the institutions of the Fifth Republic) 
n° 2008-724.2 The bill was mainly based on the research work done by a comité des 
sages (expert committee) “de réflexion et de proposition sur la modernisation et le 
rééquilibrage des institutions de la Vème République” (for the reflection and the 
proposition on the modernization and rebalancing of the institutions of the Fifth 
Republic).3 It had been presented by the Government to Parliament on 23 April 
                                                 
1 Federico Fabbrini is a PhD student at the Law Department, European University Institute. He holds an 
undergraduate degree summa cum laude in European and Transnational Law at the University of Trento 
School of Law (Italy) and a JD summa cum laude in International Law at the University of Bologna School 
of Law (Italy). He was aggregated fellow at the Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris (France) in 2007 and a 
visiting student at the University of California Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (USA) in 2005. Email: 
Federico.Fabbrini@EUI.eu. 
2 The full text of the revision bill is published on the Official Journal of the French Republic n. 171 of 24 
July 2008 and available in French in the web site of the Government at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte= JORFTEXT000019237256 as well as is in the 
web sites of the National Assembly at: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/dossiers/reforme_5eme.asp and of the Senate at: 
http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/pjl07-365.html, last accessed 25 September 2008. These websites also 
contain in French the bill presented by the Government and all the documents of the parliamentary 
revision procedure, including the report of the Law Commissions, the amendments proposed and the 
text of the bill as approved in both Chambers. For an overview of the political context in which the 
revision took place see: Stefano Ceccanti, Le istituzioni ed il sistema politico dopo il primo quinquiennato, in 
LA FRANCIA DI SARKOZY, 27 (Gianfranco Baldini & Marc Lazar eds., 2007); Paolo Passaglia, Le elezioni 
legislative in Francia: più conferme che novità, 4 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (QUAD. COST.) 860 (2007) 
3 The full text of the research work is available in French in the web site of the Comité at: 
http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr, last accessed 25 September 2008. The website also provides in 
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2008 and twice voted for by the Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly) and the 
Sénat (Senate).  
 
According to Article 89 of the 1958 French Constitution,4 which sets out the 
amendment procedures,5 “(1) The initiative for amending the Constitution shall 
belong both to the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Prime Minister 
and to the members of Parliament. (2) A Government or private member's bill for 
amendment must be passed by the two Assemblies in identical terms. The 
amendment shall become definitive after approval by referendum. (3) Nevertheless, 
the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to a referendum when the 
President of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in Congress; 
in this case, the proposed amendment shall be approved only if it is accepted by a 
three-fifths majority of the votes cast. The Bureau of the Congress shall be that of 
the National Assembly”. 
 
The constitutional bill n° 2008-724 “is a coherent ensemble, that proposes a global 
and ambitious institutional change”6 and since roughly 33 articles over 89 of the 
French Constitution of 1958 have been changed, the bill has been called “the most 
important revision to which the Fundamental Law has been submitted”.7 All 
branches of Government are affected by the reform, which operates in three 
directions. A first series of provisions is aimed at renovating the exercise of the 
executive power by solving the ambiguous diarchy between the President of the 
                                                                                                                             
French the Presidential decree establishing the Comité as well as the name of its 12 members and all the 
documents thereof among which the final report entitled UNE VÉME RÉPUBLIQUE PLUS DÉMOCRATIQUE 
(2007). For an overview of the work of the Comité and an early comment on its proposals see: Federico 
Fabbrini, Francia: è arrivata l’ora dell’exception d’inconstitutionnalité? 1 QUAD. COST. 150 (2008); Federico 
Fabbrini, Breaking from Tradition: Reshaping the French System of Constitutional Review, 2 WASHINGTON 
UNDERGRADUATE LAW REVIEW (WULR) No.1 1 (2008) 
4 The full text of the French Constitution is available in English in the International Constitutional Law 
web site at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/fr00000_.html, last accessed 25 September 2008.  
5 BERTRAND MATHIEU & MICHEL VERPEAUX, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 220 (2004). Since the constitutional 
revision of 1962, however, another way of amending the Constitution has been found in Article 11 that 
affirms: “The President of the Republic may, on the proposal of the Government during sessions, or on a 
joint motion of the two Assemblies published in the Official Journal, submit to a referendum any bill 
dealing with the organization of the governmental authorities […]”. See, Dominique Rousseau, 
L’invenzione continua della V Repubblica, in L’ORDINAMENTO COSTITUZIONALE DELLA V REPUBBLICA 
FRANCESE, 34, 75 (Dominique Rousseau ed., 2000) 
6 UNE VEME REPUBLIQUE PLUS DEMOCRATIQUE, 7 (2007) 
7 Patrick Roger, La derniére mue?, in LE MONDE, 21 May 2008 
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Republic and the Prime Minister,8 recognizing the supremacy of the first and at the 
same time limiting his prerogatives.  A second set of measures is devoted to the 
legislative power with the goal to rehabilitate the role of Parliament by eliminating 
some of the harsher instruments of rationalized parliamentarianism introduced in 
1958.9 
 
A third field of intervention then, concerns judicial power and droits du citoyen 
(rights of the citizen) and certainly the most noteworthy provision here is the 
introduction of a new form of a posteriori constitutional review of legislation 
(contrôle de constitutionnalité). Indeed, even though all the changes are of great 
relevance, this one constitutes a “true revolution”10, since France was one of the few 
democracies that didn’t allow its courts to review whether acts of Parliament 
infringed over the fundamental rights of citizens. As such, I will devote the paper 
to this specific topic, with the purpose of highlighting the magnitude of the reform 
and its rupture with the French constitutional tradition. As I will argue,  the major 
effect of the constitutional revision is to import into the French legal system the 
ideas of constitutional adjudication elaborated by Hans Kelsen. 
 
Kelsen, a Czech jurist and the author of the Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law),11 
is the architect of the centralized model of constitutional review.12 Drawing 
inspiration from the American constitutional system, Kelsen believed that the 
Constitution ought to be the supreme law of the land and that no statute could 
violate it. However he did not support the idea that ordinary courts should have 
the duty to verify the compliance of acts of Parliament with the Grundnorm 
(Fundamental law), on the understanding that the function of constitutional review 
was in a sense a legislative function, even if purely negative.13 He supported, 
therefore, the institution of ad hoc (special) Constitutional Tribunals, charged with 
                                                 
8 CARLO FUSARO, LE RADICI DEL SEMIPRESIDENZIALISMO, 75 (1998) 
9 STEFANO CECCANTI, LA FORMA DI GOVERNO PARLAMENTARE IN TRASFORMAZIONE, 107 (1997) 
10 Gerome Courtois, Le Parlement à qui perd gagne, in LE MONDE, 21 May 2008 
11 HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (1960). English translation by Max Knight: PURE THEORY OF LAW 
(1989) 
12 MAURO CAPPELLETTI, IL CONTROLLO GIUDIZIARIO DI COSTITUZIONALITÀ DELLE LEGGI NEL DIRITTO 
COMPARATO 52 (1972) 
13 Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Comparative Perspective: The European Model as Against 
the American in Terms of Politics, Law and Interpretation (Association of American Law Schools, Conference 
on Constitutional Law, Washington, 5-8 June 2002) available at: 
http://www.aals.org/profdev/constitutional/rosenfeld.html, last accessed 25 September 2008.  
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the specific duty to review the constitutionality of legislation and whose judges 
should be nominated intuitu personae (with special criteria).14 
To assess the impact of a transformation that, metaphorically, brings Kelsen in 
Paris, I will structure my paper as follows. In part B, I will give an overview of the 
main characteristics and of the evolution of French constitutional review, analyzing 
the historical French distrust toward an institution that was considered to be the 
instrument of the gouvernment de juges (government of judges). In part C,  I will 
illustrate the main features of the new form of a posteriori constitutional review 
introduced by the revision bill by describing its technicalities as well as certain 
caveats that need to be taken into account while considering the reform. Finally, in 
part D,  I will underline how much this constitutional reform is inspired by the 
theorical elaboration of Kelsen, and what are the effects of this Kelsenian legacy on 
the system of human rights protection in France. 
 
 
B. Rousseau in Paris 
 
Traditionally France has been averse to judicial review of legislation15. Since the 
Revolution of 1789,  a strict separation of powers rule prevailed and the judiciary 
was not given the right to interfere with the activities of the legislature. While 
during the Ancient Règime judges could contest the legitimacy of a bill passed by the 
legislative power, “no court since the Revolution has ever invalidated or otherwise 
refused to apply a statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutional”16. Thus, 
contrary to what happened in the United States (where the Supreme Court17 ,”with 
a stroke of genius”, acknowledged its power to review legislation,18 making true 
Madison’s motto that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”19), 
supremacy of Parliament and the lack of judicial review have been the defining 
                                                 
14 Jörg Luther, La composizione dei tribunali costituzionali e le autonomie territoriali, in LA COMPOSIZIONE 
DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE: SITUAZIONE ITALIANA ED ESPERIENZE STRANIERE, 67, 76 (Adele Anzon & 
Gaetano Azzariti eds., 2004) 
15 Michel Troper, Judicial Power and Democracy, in 1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (EJLS) No.2 1 
(2007) 
16 ALEC STONE SWEET, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE, 8 (1992) 
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
18 Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Two Hundred Years of Marbury v. Madison: The Struggle for Judicial Review of 
Constitutional Questions in the United States and in Europe, in 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL No.6, 685, 687 
(2004) 
19 FEDERALIST PAPERS, number LI (J. Madison) 
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features of French “’Jacobinian’ constitutionalism” since the time of the 
Revolution.20 
 
The theorization of Jean Jacques Rousseau was of particular relevance in shaping 
the traits of French Republicanism. According to the Swiss philosopher, “only la 
volonté générale (the general will) can direct the State according to the object for 
which it was instituted, i.e., the common good”21. Since the general will “considers 
only the common interest”22 - diverging from the will of all, which “takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills”23 – it ought be 
embodied in an organ representing the social compact, i.e. the legislator, and 
expressed through general and abstract laws. The Declaration of the Rights of Men 
and Citizen of 1789 codified this vision, stating in its Article 6, “la loi est l’expression 
de la volonté générale (the act of Parliament is the expression of the general will)”.  
 
The consequence of Parliamentary sovereignty was to reduce the role of judges to 
that of “la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi (the mouth that pronounces the 
words of the law), mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or 
rigor”,24 as Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, famously wrote. Not 
surprisingly, “the judge’s role in this centralized system is subservient and 
bureaucratic. […He] may be required to verify the existence and applicability of a 
command but he may not investigate the work of the legislature any further”.25 The 
dogma of “la intangibilité de la loi (the intangibility of the law)”26 together with the 
myth of the judge as a “syllogism machine”27, then, consolidated during the 
                                                 
20 AUGUSTO BARBERA, LE BASI FILOSOFICHE DEL COSTITUZIONALISMO, 6 (1997) 
21 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, LE CONTRAT SOCIAL, Book 2, Chapter 1 (1762) Italian Translation by Valentino 
Gerratana: IL CONTRATTO SOCIALE, 63 (1965) 
22 Id., Book 2, Chapter 3. Italian Translation by Valentino Gerratana: IL CONTRATTO SOCIALE, 68 (1965) 
23 Id. 
24 MONTESQUIEU, L’ESPRIT DES LOIS, Book 11, Chapter 6 (1748) Italian translation by Mauro Cotta : IL 
PENSIERO POLITICO DI MONTESQUIEU 207 (1995) 
25 STONE SWEET, supra note 16, 26 
26 Maria Rosaria Donnarumma, Un mito infranto: l’intangibilité de la loi. Il controllo della ‘ragionevolezza’ delle 
leggi in Francia, in 4 DIRITTOE SOCIETÀ (DIR. SOC.) 521, 579 (2007) 
27 Charles Eisenmann, La pensée constitutionnelle de Montesquieu, in LA PENSEE POLITIQUE ET 
CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE MONTESQUIEU: BICENTENAIRE DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS 1748-1948, 133 (Boris Mirkine-
Guetzévitch & Henri Puget eds., 1952)  
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nineteenth century and survived in the Fifth Republic notwithstanding the burial of 
the parliamentary regime28. 
 
Indeed, when the Framers of the Constitution of 1958 instituted a Conseil 
Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) – endowed with the function, among 
others, of exercising a priori constitutional review – their intent was not to create an 
organ charged with the duty to protect fundamental rights.29 The Framers, in fact,  
intended to create an arm against the deviation of the parliamentary regime.30 “The 
function of the Council in this system was made explicit: to facilitate the 
centralization of executive authority and to ensure that the system would not 
somehow revert to traditional parliamentary orthodoxy”31. The Council itself 
originally complied with this understanding: e.g. in the 1962 Loi référendaire32 
decision, it refused to review referendum laws, thereby defining itself as a mere 
“organ that regulates the activity of the public powers”.33 
 
The peculiarities of French constitutional review indicate the continuity with the 
‘Jacobinian’ tradition. According to Article 61(2) – as revised in 197434 -  “acts of 
Parliament may, before their promulgation, be submitted to the Constitutional 
Council by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the 
Assemblée Nationale, the President of the Sénat, sixty deputies or sixty senators”. As 
such, the Council rules a priori, “on the constitutionality of bills which have been 
definitively adopted by Parliament but not yet promulgated by the executive,”35 in 
                                                 
28 Stefano Ceccanti, La V Repubblica: un lento (e parziale) avvicinamento alle altre forme di governo europee, in 
L’ORDINAMENTO COSTITUZIONALE DELLA V REPUBBLICA FRANCESE, 13, 14 (Dominique Rousseau ed., 2000) 
29 LOUIS FAVOREU & LOIC PHILIP, LE GRANDES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONAL, 177 (2005)  
30 TEXTES ET DOCUMENTS SUR LA PRATIQUE INSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA VEME REPUBLIQUE, 5 (Didier Maus ed., 
1978) 
31 STONE SWEET, supra note 16, 47 
32 Loi referendaire Décision 62-20 DC, 6 November 1962 
33 Louis Favoreu, Le Conseil Constitutionnel régulateur de l’activité normative des pouvoirs publics, in REVUE 
DU DROIT PUBLIC (RDP) 7 (1967) 
34 Before the Constitutional Revision law n° 1974-904 only the President of the Republic, the Prime 
Minister and the Presidents of the two Assemblies could refer a law to the Constitutional Council. See: 
JEAN JACQUES CHEVALLIER, GUY CARCASSONNE & OLIVIER DUHAMEL, LA VE REPUBLIQUE: 1958-2004 
231(2004) 
35 STONE SWEET, supra note 16, 8 
2008]                                                                                                                                  1303 A Posteriori Constitutional Review in France
the absence of a concrete case and only upon referral of five political authorities.36 
Therefore, once the law is enacted “it may not be challenged or made subject to any 
jurisdictional control other than that of the Parliament itself”.37 
 
Notwithstanding its structural limits, the Constitutional Council remarkably 
expanded its role in the course of the years. With a juridical coup d’Etat,38 in the 1971 
decision Liberté d’association39 the Council incorporated the Preamble of the 
Constitution of 1958 within the bloc de constitutionnalité (norms of reference for 
exercising constitutional review).40 The Constitution of 1958 was entirely dedicated 
to the framework of government. The Preamble of 1958, on the contrary, recalled 
the Declaration of Rights of Men and Citizen of 1789 (the magna charta of individual 
liberties) and the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 (a charter dedicated to social 
rights). The effect of the 1971 decision, then, was to invent a compound Bill of 
Rights and to transform the Council into an institution charged with the protection 
of fundamental rights.41 
 
The “strengthening”42 of the Constitutional Council was also favored by the 1974 
constitutional revision that extended the droit de saisine (right of referral) to the 
Council to sixty deputies or sixty senators.43 In fact, “by the mid-1970s, the politics 
of review [became] a central features of opposition tactics”44 with an increase in the 
quality and quantity of cases to be decided by the Council. However, the main 
features of French judicial review remained largely unchallenged, as the Council 
would still review legislation a priori, abstractly and upon request of political 
authorities. Only in the 1990s were several attempts made to reform the system, but 
                                                 
36 GIUSEPPE DE VERGOTTINI, DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE COMPARATO, 186 (2004) 
37 STONE SWEET, supra note 16, 8 
38 Alec Stone Sweet, The Juridical Coup d’Etat and the Problem of Authority, in 8 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 
No.10, 915, 922 (2007) 
39 Liberté d’association Décision 71-44 DC, 16 July 1971 
40 Bertrand Mathieu & Michel Verpaux, La garantie des droits et libértes, in LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 
91, 92 (Michel Verpaux & Maryvonne Bonnard eds., 2007) 
41 FAVOREU & PHILIP, supra note 29, 254 
42 DOMINIQUE ROUSSEAU, DROIT DU CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL ,63 (2004) 
43 See, supra, note 34 
44 STONE SWEET, supra note 16, 60 
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all of them failed45. In the recent comprehensive constitutional reform, though, the 
effort proved successful and eventually a form of a posteriori judicial review has 
been introduced in France. 
C. The exception d’inconstitutionnalité 
 
Article 26 of the constitutional revision bill n° 2008-724 introduces in the French 
Constitution a new provision: Article 61-1, will be placed immediately after Article 
61 (which, as we saw in the previous section, disciplines a priori constitutional 
review). The provision reads as follows:  
 
“(1) When, in the course of a controversy before a judicial court, it is 
claimed that a statutory disposition infringes over the rights and 
liberties that the Constitution safeguards, the Constitutional Council 
may be requested to judge on the issue by referral of the Conseil d’Etat 
(Council of State)46 or of the Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation)47, 
which shall decide in a timely manner. (2) An organic law sets the 
conditions for the application of this article”.48 
 
Article 61-1 grants the Constitutional Council the power to exercise a posteriori 
constitutional review. The technical mean by which this goal is achieved is the 
                                                 
45 A constitutional bill amending the Constitution to introduce a posteriori constitutional review was 
submitted to Parliament by the President of the Republic Mitterand on 30 March 1990, under the advice 
of the former President of the Constitutional Council Badinter. After two separate votes in the Assemblée 
Nationale and the Sénat, however, the two chambers of Parliaments, because of the opposition of the 
conservative party, didn’t agree on the same text and therefore the proposal failed. A similar draft 
written by constitutional law professor Vedel was later presented to Parliament on 10 March 1993, but 
was dismissed by new conservative majority elected in spring. For a historical overview of these event 
see: NICOLO ZANON, L’EXCEPTION D’INCONTITUTIONNALITE IN FRANCIA: UNA RIFORMA DIFFICILE 93 (1990); 
Didier Maus, Nouveaux regards sur le contrôle de constitutionnalité per voie d’exception, in MELANGES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE MICHEL TROPER, 665, 668 (Véronique Champeil-Desplats et al. eds., 2007). The main 
features of the two proposal are analyzed by: JEAN LUC WARSMANN, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA 
COMMISION DES LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLES DE L’ASSEMBLE NATIONALE N. 892-2008 439 (2008) available in 
French at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r0892.asp, last accessed 25 September 2008.  
46 The Conseil d’Etat is the French Supreme Court for administrative justice. It hears both recourses 
against decrees and other executive decisions as well as appellate cases from lower administrative 
courts. Its decisions are final. 
47 The Cour de Cassation is the French Supreme Court for civil and criminal justice. It is the main court of 
last resort in France (excluding cases of administrative justice, which go before the Conseil d’Etat) 
48 Author’s translation. For the French text consult the Official Journal of the French Republic n. 171 of 
July 24th 2008 available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte= 
JORFTEXT000019237256, last accessed 25 September 2008. 
2008]                                                                                                                                  1305 A Posteriori Constitutional Review in France
exception d’inconstitutionnalité (plea of unconstitutionality), an instrument shared by 
all the juridical systems that have attributed the power of constitutional review to 
ad hoc, centralized courts, following the theorization of Hans Kelsen. In those 
systems, ordinary and administrative judges can not review on their own the 
constitutionality of legislation; however, when it is claimed in the course of a legal 
dispute that the statute that commands the case is contrary to the Constitution, the 
judge may suspend the decision of the case in front of him and recur to the 
Constitutional tribunal asking for a ruling on the matter.49  
 
If the Constitutional tribunal does not declare the statute unconstitutional, the 
judge may proceed in the decision of the controversy applying the statute in its 
ruling. If, otherwise, the Constitutional tribunal does declare the statute 
unconstitutional, the judge should decide the case without taking into 
consideration the voided statute.50 Accordingly, Article 62 of the French 
Constitution, as amended by Article 30 of the constitutional revision bill, affirms 
that: “(2) A statutory disposition declared unconstitutional on the basis of Article 
61-1 is repealed as from the day of the publication of the ruling of the 
Constitutional Council […] (3) The decisions of the Constitutional Council shall not 
be subject to appeal to any jurisdiction. They shall be binding on the governmental 
authorities and on all administrative and jurisdictional authorities”.51 
 
A peculiarity of the exception d’inconstitutionnalité mechanism recently introduced in 
the French Constitution, however, is that not all judges are allowed to recur to the 
Constitutional Council and ask whether a statutory disposition infringes over the 
rights and liberties that the Constitution safeguards. Indeed, only the top ordinary 
and administrative tribunals, i.e. the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation, may 
defer a matter to the Constitutional Council. When lower judges face a 
constitutional question, they shall, on the contrary, submit the matter to their 
Supreme Ordinary or Administrative Court. The high court has the duty to verify 
the seriousness of the matter in a timely manner; only when the seriousness test is 
passed the Constitutional Council may then be called upon to review the allegedly 
unconstitutional statute. 
 
                                                 
49 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 12, 98 
50 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, La giurisdizione costituzionale, in MANUALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO, 657, 666 
(Giuliano Amato & Augusto Barbera eds., 1991) 
51 See, supra, note 48 
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The choice not to allow lower judges to recur directly to the Constitutional Council 
is known as ‘double-filter mechanism’ and has drawn much criticism.52 Indeed, 
even though this mechanism has several advantages since, “on one hand it shelters 
the Council from being over flooded by lower judges’ referrals, and, on the other 
hand it allows the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation to participate in the 
elaboration of the Council’s case law”,53 the proposal contains various limitations. 
In fact, not only the beneficial effects of a direct dialogue between judges and 
Constitutional Council will be neutralized,54 but also the achievement of the reform 
could be jeopardized. After all, “shouldn’t the high courts be interested in 
defending their competences by deferring only an infinitesimal quantity of cases to 
the Council and thus making no sense of the reform?”55 
 
The draft constitutional bill elaborated by the comité de sages did not grant to the 
Supreme Administrative and Ordinary Courts the power to review the seriousness 
of the constitutional question to be submitted to the Constitutional Council. The 
‘double filter mechanism’ materialized during the Parliamentary work under the 
lobbying of the Conseil d’Etat which, besides a judicial function, also furnishes legal 
advice to the Government in drafting legislation.56 Traditionally the most important 
French institution, the Conseil d’Etat is very deferential toward the legislature but 
endowed of a power of moral suasion vis à vis the other branches of government.57 
However, as the Constitutional Council in the course of time strengthened its 
position, becoming the prominent institution in the protection of fundamental 
liberties, the Conseil d’Etat has seen its prerogatives diminishing.   
 
The success of the Conseil d’Etat in establishing a ‘double filter mechanism’ that 
allows it (and the Cour de Cassation) to interfere in the dialogue between the lower 
judges and the Constitutional Council may, nevertheless, turn out to be a ‘Pirrus 
victory’. Such a complicated mechanism  may be a disincentive for lower ordinary 
                                                 
52 ZANON, supra note 45, 129 
53 JEAN LUC WARSMANN, supra note 45, 439 
54 Valerio Onida, Giurisdizione e giudici nella giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, in CORTE 
COSTITUZIONALE E SVILUPPO DELLA FORMA DI GOVERNO IN ITALIA, 159 (Paolo Barile et al. eds., 1984) 
55 The question was raised by professor Mathieu during an interview with the members of the Law 
Commission of the Assemblée Nationale and is reported in WARSMANN, supra note 45, 438 
56 Aldo Maria Sandulli, La giustizia, in ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO, 381, 392 (Sabino Cassese 
ed., 2004) 
57 Andrea Patroni Griffi, Il Conseil Constitutionnel e il controllo della ‘ragionevolezza’, in 1 RIVISTA 
ITALIANA DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUITARTO (RIDPC) 39, 73 (1998) 
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or administrative judges, dealing with an allegedly unconstitutional statute, to raise 
constitutional questions. Moreover, because in the French legal order treaties have a 
supra-legislative status, lower judges already have the power to review on their 
own whether a statute complies with international treaties (contrôle de 
conventionnalité).58 And since there are international conventions that have 
catalogues of rights quite comparable to a constitutional Bill of rights, this review 
tends to resemble heavily a form of decentralized judicial review.59 When assessing 
the impact of the current constitutional reform, therefore, this caveat also needs to 
be taken into account.  
 
 
D. Kelsen in Paris 
 
Beyond the technical debate about the features of the exception d’inconstitutionnalité 
mechanism introduced by the recent constitutional revision, the importance of the 
reform itself shall be highlighted. The introduction of a form of a posteriori 
constitutional review of legislation represents a milestone in the juridical history of 
a country that was traditionally hostile to judicial review and the “limitation of 
parliamentary sovereignty”.60 Eventually, also in France, individuals will be 
allowed to contest, in the course of a concrete controversy, by recurring to the 
Constitutional Council (via the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation), the 
legitimacy of a statue that unjustly abridges the rights and liberties recognized by 
the Constitution. As such, this novelty may be appreciated as an “important step of 
the development of the Etat de droit (Rule of Law)”.61 
 
From this point of view, the innovation brought forward by the constitutional 
revision bill, reconciles the French juridical system with the theoretical and 
practical work of Hans Kelsen, who was favourable – as anticipated in the 
introduction - towards the realization of “a Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (constitutional 
justice), that is supportive of granting the function of safeguarding the Constitution 
to an independent tribunal”.62 Indeed, according to the Czech jurist, the legal order is 
                                                 
58 MAUS, supra note 45, 675 
59 Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Contrôle de constitutionnalité et contrôle de conventionnalité, in MELANGES 
EN L’HONNEUR DE DANIEL LABETOULLE, 1, 13 (Ronny Abraham et al. eds., 2007) 
60 BARBERA, supra note 20, 13 
61 UNE VEME REPUBLIQUE, supra note 2, 90 
62 Hans Kelsen, Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? in DIE JUSTIZ, 576-628 (1930) Translated in Italian 
by Carmelo Geraci: LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 239 (1981); italics in the original text 
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a “Stufenbau (hierarchical structure)”63 of norms, on the top of which stands the 
Constitution. It is therefore necessary to arrange certain technical means in order to 
assure the supremacy of the fundamental norm. Attributing to a specially created 
court the concrete function of “voiding the unconstitutional statutes secures the 
main and most effective warranty for the Constitution”.64 
 
Moreover, the exception d’inconstitutionnalité introduced by the constitutional 
reform, by establishing a ‘double filter’ to be exercised by the Supreme Ordinary 
and Administrative Courts, directly evokes the method set up in the Austrian 
Constitution written by Kelsen and embodying par excellence the idea of 
constitutional justice.65 Indeed, in the 1920 Austrian Constitution, as modified in 
1929,66 the “unconstitutionality of an act of Parliament could be alleged only in 
front of the Obster Gerichtshof (Supreme Ordinary Court) or of the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court), as only those tribunals 
could suspend in that case the proceeding pending in front of them and ask the 
Verfassungsgerichthof (Constitutional Court) to declare the statute void whenever 
they doubted of its constitutionality”.67 
 
A significant indication of the realignment of the French system of constitutional 
review with the Kelsenian model of constitutional adjudication is the approval by 
the Sénat of amendment n. 321, introducing in the bill a new Article 24-3 affirming: 
“In the Constitution, the words ‘Constitutional Council’ shall be replaced by the 
words ‘Constitutional Court’”. The socialist Senator (and former President of the 
Constitutional Council) Badinter presented the amendment on the following 
argument: “The name adopted in 1958 appeared already paradoxical […] as the 
institution had essentially a judicial function. This role will be strengthened by the 
introduction of the exception d'inconstitutionnalité. It ought therefore be recognized 
                                                 
63 HANS KELSEN, REIHNE RECHTSLEHERE (1934) Translated in Italian by Renato Treves: LINEAMENTI DI 
DOTTRINA PURA DEL DIRITTO, 105 (2000) 
64 Hans Kelsen, La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la Constitution (La justice constitutionnelle), in XXXV RDP, 
197-257 (1928) Translated in Italian by Carmelo Geraci, LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE, 170 (1981) 
65 WARSMANN, supra note 45, 435 
66 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 12, 94 
67 Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation. A comparative study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution, in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (JOUR. OF POL.), 183-200 (1942) Translated in Italian by Carmelo 
Geraci, LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE, 308 (1981) 
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to the institution its true identity of ‘court’, following the example of its European 
homologues”.68 
 
The amendment was later rejected in the Assemblée Nationale and did not appear in 
the final version of the revision bill. However, the proposal to change the name of 
the institution – “Court and Council, as if it was the difference between a judge and 
a consultive committee”69 – also symbolically highlights the spreading awareness 
that with the approval of the reform the Council will wear ‘Kelsenian clothes’, 
becoming a true judicial institution charged with the duty to review 
constitutionality of legislation. Thus in the comparative perspective, the 
introduction of a mechanism of a posteriori constitutional review of legislation 
certainly terminates the anomaly of the French constitutional model and 
determines a convergence with most of the other European systems of 
constitutional adjudication, shaped over the Kelsenian prototype.70 
 
In other respects, the shift of the French judicial system toward a Kelsenian ratio, 
can be appreciated in the context of the transformation of the European legal space 
in a true Grundrechtsgemeinshaft (community of rights).71 Indeed, at the 
supranational level, both the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights have began taking human rights seriously72 and claiming a 
constitutional status73. The human rights’ case law of these two European courts is 
becoming increasingly influential and often used as an example even by the 
domestic courts of states with well-built ‘legal nationalism’.74 There is, therefore, a 
strong incentive (if not duty) for the national jurisdictions to elevate their standard 
                                                 
68 Available in French at: http://ameli.senat.fr/amendements/2007-2008/365/Amdt_321.html, last 
accessed 25 September 2008.  
69 BARBERA, supra note 20, 13 
70 ANDREA MORRONE, IL CUSTODE DELLA RAGIONEVOLEZZA, 506 (2000) 
71 Armin Von Bogdany, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?, in 37 COMMON MARKET 
LAW REVIEW (CML REV), 1307, 1308 (2000) 
72 Marta Cartabia, L’ora dei diritti fondamentali nell’Unione Europea, in I DIRITTI IN AZIONE, 1, 37 (Marta 
Cartabia ed., 2007) 
73 Luzius Wildhaber, A constitutional future for the European Court of Human Rights?, in 23 HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW JOURNAL (HRLJ) 161 (2002) 
74 Joel Andriantsimbazovina, La prise en compte de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme par le 
Conseil Constitutionnel, in 18 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 1 (2004); MAUS, supra note 45, 673; 
Jacques Ziller, L’européisation du droit : de l’Elargissement des champs du droit de l’Union européenne à une 
transformation des droits des Etats membres, in EUI Law Dept. Working Papers No.19, 6 (2006) 
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of rights’ protection to comply with the growing attention to fundamental liberties 
at the European level.75  
 
France’s paradox was that while individuals had, since the eighteenth century, the 
right to contest the legality of an executive decree in front of the administrative 
judge (i.e. the Conseil d’Etat), they did not have any means to defend their rights at 
the national level from an unconstitutional statute. Individuals  now have at their 
disposal, however,  effective remedies at the supranational level and may benefit of 
a last resort mechanism in front of the European Court of Human Rights. From this 
point of view, as Prime Minister Fillon acknowledged, with the constitutional 
revision bill “this French idiosyncrasy ends”.76 Even though the reform does not 
establish an individual direct recourse to the Constitutional Council, like the 
German Verfassungsbeschwerde (Constitutional complaint), the introduction of a 
posteriori constitutional review significantly strengthens the protection of individual 
rights at the domestic level.77 
 
Moreover, by amending the 1958 Constitution with the introduction of the exception 
d’inconstitutionnalité the revision bill n° 2008-724 recognizes that democracy today 
finds its raison d’être “in pluralistic social and institutional systems, empowered by 
the progressive erosion of the classical concept of sovereignty as a consequence of 
the processes of international and supranational institutional integration”.78 
Contemporary multicultural societies are characterized by a growing concern and 
demand for individual liberty.79 The ‘Jacobinian’ belief that liberties are created and 
secured through the activity of a god-almighty legislature is thus gradually 
substituted by the consciousness that the will of the majority may violate the rights 
                                                 
75 Diletta Tega, La CEDU nella giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, in 2 QUAD. COST. 431 (2007) 
76 The speech of Prime Minister Fillon at the Assemblée Nationale on May 20th 2008 to present the 
constitutional revision bill is available at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2007-
2008/20080161.asp#INTER_0, last accessed 25 September 2008.  
77 MAURO CAPPELLETTI, LA GIURISDIZIONE DELLE LIBERTÀ (1955) 
78 MORRONE, supra note 70, 524  
79 See, among others: NORBERTO BOBBIO, L’ETÀ DEI DIRITTI (1992), GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, IL DIRITTO MITE 
97 (1992); PETER HÄBERLE, DIRITTO E VERITÀ (2000); ALESSANDRA FACCHI, I DIRITTI NELL’EUROPA 
MULTICULTURALE 21 (2001); ANTONIO CASSESE, I DIRITTI UMANI OGGI 3 (2005); Jürgen Habermas, Lotta di 
riconoscimento nello stato democratico di diritto, in MULTICULTURALISMO, 63 (Jürgen Habermas & Charles 
Taylor eds., 2005); ALESSANDRA FACCHI, BREVE STORIA DEI DIRITTI UMANI 144 (2007);  
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of the minority and by the ‘liberal’ confidence that a better deal is to empower 
judges of the duty to enforce individual rights.80   
 
In other words, the introduction in France of a form of a posteriori constitutional 
review of legislation embodies a transition from the logic of Rousseau, - of the 
inanimate judge bouche de la loi, expression of a general will that may never be 
wrong - to the logic of Kelsen. Here, the constitutional judge is the guardian (Hüter) 
of the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution - a living institution that 
safeguards the principle of pluralism and the individual liberties whenever the 
exercise of the majority power degenerates into tyranny. Kelsen’s vision, by 
recognizing that the majority may express its wishes in so far that it does not violate 
the rights of the individual, represents a successful attempt to balance the need of 
unity with the desire of pluralism. 
 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
French academics and politicians have been conscious for the last twenty years of 
the need to renovate the 1958 Constitution, especially of the need to introduce a 
new form of a posteriori constitutional review of legislation. Notwithstanding the 
fact that all such proposals failed, the reform was seen as something “that for sure 
[was] about to happen, soon or later”.81 Therefore, even though the revision bill was 
approved in Congrès only by a one vote-majority, with the conservative and centrist 
members of Parliament voting in favour of it and the socialist against it (with the 
noteworthy exception of the socialist Deputy and vice President of the comité des 
sages Lang), there was a wider consensus on the suitability of the reform. Moreover, 
many of the innovations contained in the revision bill, such as the proposal to 
introduce a form of a posteriori constitutional review, had been for many years a 
battle horse of the left and strongly opposed by the conservative right.82  
                                                 
80 Just to recall some of the wide literature on the issue, see: Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 17 
(1996); BARBERA, supra note 20, 10; MORRONE, supra note 70, 508; Giorgio Bongiovanni, Spirito protestante, 
libertà religiosa e Dichiarazioni americane e francese, in LA DICHIARAZIONE DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO E DEL 
CITTADINO DI GEORGE JELLINEK, v, xviii (Giorgio Bongiovanni ed., 2002); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, UNA 
RAGIONEVOLE APOLOGIA DEI DIRITTI UMANI, 34 (2003); Dieter Grimm, Il significato della stesura di un 
catalogo europeo dei diritti fondamentali, in DIRITTI E COSTITUZIONE NELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, 5 (Gustavo 
Zagrebelsky ed., 2003); Armin Von Bogdany, Il costituzionalismo nel diritto internazionale, in POPOLI E 
CIVILITÀ, 183 (Gustavo Gozzi & Giorgio Bongiovanni eds., 2006)  
81 Louis Favoreau, La questione préjudicielle de constitutionnalité, in MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE 
ARDANT, 265 (Guy Carcassonne et al. eds., 1999) 
82 Stefano Ceccanti, Ora la Francia è un pò meno gollista, in IL RIFORMISTA, 22 July 2008 
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A recent interview in French newspaper Le Monde83 gives evidence of the bipartisan 
support for the introduction of the exception d’inconstitutionnalité. Asked to 
comment on the new Article 61-1 of the French Constitution, the gaullist Deputy, 
former Prime Minister and President of the comitè des sages, Balladur affirmed that 
this innovation “is one of the most important measures that we propose”. 
However, the socialist Senator Badinter had also declared in the same interview, “I 
am obviously favourable to the exception d’inconstitutionnalité […] In a democracy, it 
should not be given effect to an act of Parliament that is contrary to the 
fundamental rights of citizen. This is a primary necessity. This reform is therefore a 
step forward”. 
 
Indeed, the introduction of a posteriori constitutional review represents a milestone 
innovation in French constitutional history. The design of this new legislative 
reality undeniably represents a change in paradigm, that was made possible by 
peculiar political and historical conditions.84 On one hand, there is increasing 
attention towards human rights at the European level. On the other hand, 
contemporary societies become more pluralistic and multicultural. The concern for 
a stronger protection of fundamental rights and liberties, under both internal and 
external pressures, is at the core of this institutional change. Even though certain 
caveats are necessary, it is likely that a posteriori constitutional review will shape the 
life of the Fifth Republic in the years to come. Embracing the Kelsenian model of 
constitutional adjudication means breaking with the ‘Jacobinian’ constitutional 
tradition that considers the law as the expression of a general will that may never 
be wrong, but also putting the individual, with his bundle of rights and liberties, at 
the heart of the constitutional cosmos. 
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